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Abstract
Using a general equilibrium model with private R&D ￿nancing, this article investigates the impact of trade
openness to trade on growth and on welfare for two countries equal in all aspects, except for the quality of credit
markets. We show that opening to trade increases growth in the country with better credit markets (North)
and decreases it in the other country (South). With respect to trade pattern, South imports high tech goods
and exports traditional goods. In terms of welfare, opening to trade may lower the welfare of individuals in the
short run, but in the long run all of them are better o⁄ under free trade than if they were under autarky.
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11 Introduction
The large di⁄erences in economic development across countries have been an important concern of economists.
The endogenous growth models developed in the 1980￿ s identify technological progress as a major source of growth
(Romer, 1988, 1990; and Lucas, 1988). They posit that di⁄erences in growth rates stem from disparities in the
amount of resources allocated to innovation, as in Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and
Howitt (1992). More recently, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002 and 2006), Engerman and Sokolo⁄
(2007) and Hall and Jones (1999), among others, spot institutions as a fundamental cause of economic growth
disparities, revitalizing an old idea in economics with compelling new empirical evidence and theoretical analysis.
According to this view, institutions a⁄ect economic incentives and, ultimately, decisions related to growth enhancing
activities such as investment in innovation.
In parallel, empirical studies have investigated the role of trade openness as a possible engine for growth. Frankel
and Romer (1999) ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of trade on growth, but only moderately signi￿cant. They use geography as
instrument for trade, which has been also identi￿ed as a good instrument for institutions. Going one step further,
Dollar and Kraay (2003), Rodrik et al (2004) and Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) try to disentangle the relative roles of
trade and institutions in explaining growth disparities. The results are puzzling. In most cases, the impact of trade
on growth disappears when institutions are controlled for, and in others it turns out to have a negative impact.
These results suggest that there is an interrelation between trade and institutions on their impact on trade. This
paper proposes a mechanism through which trade openness may have opposing impact on growth rates, depending
of the country￿ s institutional environment. More speci￿cally, we develop an endogenous growth model in which the
amount of resources allocated to innovation depend on the quality of credit markets. In this context, we investigate
the impact of trade on growth and on welfare for countries di⁄ering in the quality of their credit markets. We show
that opening to trade increases growth in countries with better credit markets and decreases it in countries with
worse credit markets.
In this paper we focus on credit markets, which we believe is very much related to the quality of the institutional
framework in each country, since it reacts to law, political and ethical systems. Several papers link institutional
environment to ￿nancing, such as Towsend (1979), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart
and Moore (1994,1998). Furthermore, La Porta et al (1997) and Djankov et al (2007) present empirical evidence
that countries with weaker institutions have also less developed ￿nancial markets.
We propose a general equilibrium model to investigate the role of di⁄erences in the quality of credit markets
as the driving force of di⁄erences in innovation rate across countries, and, consequently, in trade patterns and in
welfare. We focus on moral hazard as the informational friction disturbing the investor-entrepreneur relationship in
R&D. The quality of credit markets a⁄ects the intensity of this friction which, in turn, impacts the rate of return in
innovation projects. More speci￿cally, our model is inspired on Grossman and Helpman (1991) with respect to the
way innovation creates dynamic comparative advantages for countries, and to the way that it becomes an endless
2and self-sustained process. We extend the original Grossman-Helpman model by incorporating moral hazard in
R&D activity, using the moral hazard model from Tirole (2006). Thereby, we investigate the interaction between
credit market quality and R&D intensity. R&D determines innovation rates, which, in turn, a⁄ects trade patterns
and welfare.
We model credit market imperfections as a⁄ecting R&D decisions but not production, since R&D activity is
more likely to be sensitive to the quality of credit markets than production. In R&D projects, in general, investors
are less informed about entrepreneur actions and failed project have lower liquidation value.
There are two types of ￿nal goods in our model economy: a ￿ traditional￿￿nal good which uses only labor as
input, and a ￿ high-tech￿good which requires intermediate goods for its production. Intermediate goods are of
di⁄erent varieties, and they are produced only after being invented through R&D. Credit market quality a⁄ects the
amount of resources devoted to R&D activity. We analyze the impact of trade in ￿nal goods between two countries
di⁄ering in the quality of their credit markets. We consider alternative assumptions with respect to the possibility
of trade of intermediate goods, knowledge spillover and technology transfers across countries.
We ￿nd that both innovation rates and wages are higher in countries with better credit markets. International
trade increases the innovation rate in countries with better credit markets, while countries with worse credit markets
are not able to compete in R&D and lose their innovation sector when opening to trade. Additionally, countries
with better credit markets export high-tech goods and import traditional ones. This result is in line with recent
empirical evidence on ￿nancial development and trade patterns, as in Beck (2002), Hur et al (2006), Levchenko
(2007), Manova (2005) and Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005).
With respect to welfare, we ￿nd that both countries are better o⁄ under free trade compared to autarky in
the long run. World innovation rate is higher under free trade, which has a positive e⁄ect on the productivity of
high-tech good production. In the short run, however, trade liberalization may lower welfare in the country with
worse credit markets, since this country looses part of its wealth at opening. Opening to trade is more likely to be
welfare enhancing in the short run when there is knowledge spillover across countries and when technology may be
transferred internationally.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic setup of the economy, describing the equilibrium
in a closed economy, while section 3 derives the open economy equilibrium. Welfare analyzes is in section 4, and
section 5 concludes.
2 Model Setup
In this model economy, individuals are at the same time consumers and owners of all ￿rms. There are two types of
￿rms: those that produce ￿nal goods, and those that invent and then produce di⁄erent varieties of the intermediate
good. Final consumption goods are either of the traditional type, which uses only labor in production, or high-tech,
3using only intermediate goods as input. Both R&D and the production of intermediate goods use only labor in
production. Final goods market is competitive, while each intermediate good producer has monopoly power over
his variety. We use a representative consumer setup, where all variables are in per capita values.
2.1 Consumers





where C(￿) ￿ Cy(￿)￿Cz(￿)1￿￿; and Cy(￿) and Cz(￿) represent the consumption of high-tech (y) and traditional
(z) ￿nal goods at time ￿. ￿ 2 (0;1) is the subjective discount rate.











r(￿)d￿, W (t) is the initial wealth, Inc(￿) is the net income per capita, which is given by the sum











where Py and Pz are the prices of goods y and z, respectively.




= r(￿) ￿ ￿; for ￿ ￿ t (2)








; for all ￿ ￿ t, (3b)
where E(￿) ￿ P(￿)C(￿) are total consumer expenditures.
2.2 Final Goods Production
The traditional good, Z, is produced using only labor, whereas only intermediate goods are used in the high-tech
4good production, Y , according to:1













, 0 < ￿ < 1, (4b)
where n(t) is the number of varieties of intermediate goods invented until period t, and x(j) and Lz are the quantity
of the intermediate good j and labor used as inputs in the high-tech and traditional goods production, respectively.
Note that the productivity in the high-tech goods sector increases with the number of varieties of intermediate
goods. This is an interesting feature for our purposes, since the innovation activity will be the major source of
comparative advantages between countries when they are open to trade.
The ￿nal goods market is perfectly competitive, hence prices equal average cost:

















where w is the wage rate and p(j) is the price of intermediate good j.











￿E, j 2 [0;n(t)]; (6)
where, from equation (3b), ￿E is the aggregate expenditure on high-tech good or, equivalently, the aggregate sales
revenue of high-tech good.
2.3 Intermediate Goods
2.3.1 Production
We assume that each intermediate good is manufactured by a single producer, that has monopoly power over
it. This assumption may be justi￿ed by a positive cost of imitation which, combined with the assumption that
￿rms engage in ex-post price competition in a Bertrand fashion, yields no incentive to imitate. Once invented, an
intermediate good is produced using one unit of labor per unit of production. Each producer of an intermediate
good faces the demand function given by equation (6).
Due to the symmetry across ￿rms, in the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium the prices of all intermediate goods are
1The indication that the variable is a function of time is suppressed whenever it is not confusing to do so.
5equal and given by:
p(j) = px ￿
w
￿
; j 2 [0;n(t)]: (7)
The demand for each intermediate good and pro￿ts thereby generated are, respectively:







￿(j) = ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿E
n
, j 2 [0;n(t)]. (8b)
2.3.2 R&D
To be produced, an intermediate good has ￿rst to be invented, and invention is achieved through R&D. Following
Romer (1990), we assume that past R&D generates public knowledge that renders the next generation of innovation
more productive. We model this phenomenon as Grossman and Helpman (1991) do and assume the existence of
a public pool of information which contains the stock of accumulated knowledge. The measure of this pool K is
taken to be the same as that of the existing intermediate goods diversity, that is:
K(t) = n(t): (9)
We are aware that the assumption in equation (9) has some important drawbacks. First, it does not consider nor
the obsolescence of past contributions neither any complementarities between di⁄erent kinds of knowledge. Second,
spillovers are likely not to happen instantaneously, as suggested by the equation, but, rather, gradually. Finally, it
does not consider heterogeneity between industries with respect to degree of informational content. Nevertheless,
we follow previous literature and use this representation for simplicity.
The R&D activity uses only labor as input, but its outcome is uncertain. The research is successful with a
probability q, and L￿ units of labor generate aK(t)L￿(t) new varieties, where a is a parameter of labor productivity
in R&D and K(t) is given by equation (9). With probability 1 ￿ q, no new brands are invented. Therefore, the
expected outcome of R&D is qv(t)an(t)L￿(t), where v(t) is the value of a blueprint. More precisely, v(t) is the





Entrepreneurs borrow from investors in the credit market to engage in R&D to try and invent new brands.
According to the debt contract, if the project is successful, the inventing ￿rm pays an agreed upon amount for its
debt. If unsuccessful, there is no payment to the creditor. Following Tirole (2006), we assume that the probability of
success of an investment project depends on unobservable actions taken by the entrepreneurs. In particular, ￿ good
behavior￿yields a higher probability of success, qH, and no private bene￿ts to entrepreneurs. ￿ Bad behavior￿ , on its
6turn, yields a lower probability of success, qL, but entrepreneurs are able to retain a share B of the investment made
in this project. A higher B means that investors￿rights are less protected by the legal or regulatory institutions.
To have an interesting case, we assume that the expected outcome of the project is greater than its costs
only if entrepreneurs have good behavior. Clearly, investors will only lend to the inventing ￿rm if the ￿nancing
contract promotes good behavior from entrepreneurs. Since entrepreneurs￿behavior cannot be observed, it cannot
be written in a contract. The only way to induce good behavior is to have debt repayments that will make
entrepreneurs themselves prefer good behavior. If Rb is the amount the entrepreneur retain after paying its debt in
case of success, good behavior will be induced when the following incentive compatibility constraint is satis￿ed:2
qHRb ￿ qLRb + BwL￿. (11)
Thus, the ￿rms must retain a minimum of R￿
b ￿
BwL￿
qH￿qL of the outcome of a successful project to make the objectives
of both parts aligned, as implicit in the incentive compatibility constraint (11).
In addition, investors will only be willing to invest in R&D if the expected rate of return in innovation projects
is not smaller than the rate of return of the riskless asset, that is, his participation constraint is:
qHvanL￿ ￿ wL￿ ￿ qHRb ￿ rwL￿:
Substituting R￿








Equation (12) states that the project is undertaken only if its returns is strictly higher than 1 + r, since ￿ > 1 + r
due to the credit market imperfection.
We will adopt, without loss of generality, the simplifying assumption that the e⁄ective measure of productivity




Note that the left-hand side of equation (13) is the return of the project. When this ratio is greater than 1 +r,
the project has positive expected net return. ￿ may be interpreted as a measure of the credit market imperfection.
When ￿ = 1+r; all projects with positive expected net return are ￿nanced, whereas, when ￿ > 1+r, the projects
with expected return in the range [1 + r;￿) are not ￿nanced, although they have positive expected net return. The
2Note that the condition below implies risk neutrality from entrepreneurs. Although all individuals have concave utility functions,
implying risk aversion, they behave as if risk neutral with respect to this investment outcome for two reasons. First, there is no
aggregate uncertainty. By the law of large numbers, an exact share of qH or qL (depending on the entrepreneur￿ s behavior) of the
projects undertaken will be successful. Second, as each individual manager owns an equal share of all R&D projects, they can take
advantage of the law of large numbers.
7higher the value of ￿, the larger is the range of projects with positive expected net return that are not ￿nanced due
to informational asymmetry problems. The credit market imperfection is increasing in the private bene￿t accrued
to managers with bad behavior, @￿




All individuals are simultaneously workers, owners of ￿nal good ￿rms, entrepreneurs in intermediate goods ￿rms,
and investors. Each individual has an equal share of all ￿nal goods ￿rms. As those ￿rms are in competitive
markets, pro￿ts are zero, hence this ownership generates no income. To preserve the con￿ ict of interests between
entrepreneurs and investors, we assume that each individual owns an equal share of half of the intermediate goods
￿rms, and invests in the other half. We detail these roles below.
Entrepreneurs For simplicity, we assume that there is a su¢ ciently large number of ￿rms, so that the law of large
numbers applies and there is no aggregate uncertainty. At every moment, exactly a fraction qH of all investment
projects are successful. Each entrepreneur receives every moment the 1
L share of the total qHR￿
b for his fraction of
these ￿rms.
Investors Each individual invests
wL￿




L to entrepreneurs of successful
projects. At each period the investor receive his share 1
L of the monopoly pro￿t ￿ =
(1￿￿)￿E
n from production
of each of the n successfully invented varieties.
Workers Individuals are endowed with one unit of labor and they supply it inelastically. Thus, their labor income
is given the wage rate w. There are L individuals in the economy, hence that is also the total labor supply.
Aggregate Income Summing up the individual￿ s revenue for each of his activities, we get:
Inc =
w(L ￿ L￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿E
L
: (14)
On aggregate, the individual￿ s payments as investors to entrepreneurs cancel out with what they receive as entre-
preneurs. All individuals have the same behavior and they participate as workers and entrepreneurs in the same
number of ￿rms. Hence, their net income per capita is equal.
82.5 Equilibrium in a Closed Economy
We start with the description of the equilibrium in a closed economy. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991),
we normalize Py(t) and Pz(t) so that E(t) = 1, 8t. Then, in equilibrium, equation (2) yields:
r(t) = ￿: (15)
Final goods prices from equations (5) can be written as:






using the equilibrium price of intermediate goods in equation (7).
In a closed economy goods production must equal consumption. From equations (3) and using equation (16)
above, we have that:
CZ = Z =
(1 ￿ ￿)
w














where h ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿).
There are two equilibrium conditions from the ￿nancing of R&D projects. First, the inequality vn
w > ￿ (see
equation 13) cannot arise in equilibrium when ￿rms maximize pro￿ts. If that were the case, entrepreneurs￿pro￿ts
would be higher the larger were investments, leading to unbounded R&D. Since labor supply is ￿xed, this would
not be an equilibrium. Hence, the ￿nancing equilibrium condition (FEC) in the R&D activity is given by:
vn
w
￿ ￿, with equality when _ n > 0: (FEC) (19)
Second, assuming that agents have access to a riskless bond that pays r(t); the non-arbitrage condition implies
that the expected rate of return of the risky investment in R&D must be equal to the riskless rate,3 that is:
￿(t) + _ v(t) = r(t)v(t);







3We refer to the argument in footnote 2 for the risk neutral behavior of the individual here.







where ￿ ￿ _ n
n. Substituting it in the no-arbitrage condition (20), using the pro￿t equation (18) and the FEC, we
can write the non-arbitrage condition (NAC) for the innovating country as:
_ w
w
= ￿ + ￿ ￿
h
w￿
, when _ n > 0: (NAC) (22)
Equilibrium is characterized when the aggregate equity V ￿ vn (or the aggregate market value of ￿rms) is
constant. It means that in equilibrium, we must have that:
_ v
v
+ ￿ = 0:




given equation (21), which is derived the ￿nancing equilibrium condition in R&D when new varieties are produced.
Finally, there is the labor market equilibrium condition. The labor market clears when the sum of demands for
labor in R&D (L￿), intermediate goods production (LX), and traditional good production (LZ) equals the labor
supply L. We have already seen that one unit of labor produces either one unit of intermediate good or one unit of
traditional good. Hence, from equations (17) and (18), we get that LZ =
(1￿￿)
w and LX = ￿￿
w . As for the demand
for labor in R&D, note that, from our assumptions in section 2.3.2, the innovation rate is dn
dt = aqHnL￿. Therefore,




= L: (LMC) (23)
The dynamics of the economy is represented in Figure 1. The LMC curve represent equation (23), while the
NAC curve represents equation (22) for _ w
w = 0. Wages increase at points above and decrease at points below the
NAC curve. The economy is in equilibrium at the intersection point of the two curves, and it is represented by point
E in the ￿gure. The arrows indicate the equilibrium paths of the economy. Clearly, the steady-state is unstable.
The economy must then be always at the equilibrium point E, where wage and innovation rates are constant.4 The
equilibrium values for w and ￿ are:
￿ ￿ =
hL ￿ ￿(1 ￿ h)￿
h + (1 ￿ h)￿
; (24)
4Note that the equilibria in Grossman and Helpman￿ s (1991) model are also unstable.
10and:
￿ w =
h + (1 ￿ h)￿
(L + ￿)￿
: (25)
Figure 1: Closed Economy Dynamics







In terms of Figure 1, this condition ensures that the NAC curve crosses the vertical axis at a higher point than the
point the LMC curve does, so that they cross at a positive value of the innovation rate ￿.
The fact that ￿ ￿ and ￿ w are constant means that the allocation of labor remains constant across all activities
(R&D, traditional good production, and intermediate goods production). Nevertheless, the ratio Y
Z increases at
the instantaneous rate 1￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿, as the productivity of the intermediate goods in good Y ￿ s production rises with the
increase in the number of varieties. Consequently, its price also decreases as the number of intermediate goods
varieties increases. The rate of output growth converges to 1￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ in the long run.
Figure 2 presents the equilibria in two closed economies di⁄ering only the in the quality of their credit markets,
that is, the value of ￿. The LMC is the same for the two economies, but the di⁄erence in the credit market
quality a⁄ects the NAC. The NAC for the country with the best credit market (NACbest) is higher that the one for
the country with a worse credit market (NACworst). The impact of credit market imperfection on equilibrium is
summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In economies where credit market frictions are less severe (lower ￿), investment in R&D activity
and wages are higher and the number of varieties increases faster.
11Figure 2: Comparing Economies with Di⁄erent Credit Market Quality




[(1￿h)￿+h]2 < 0 and @ ￿ w
@￿ = ￿ h
￿2(L+￿) < 0. Investment in R&D
is equal to wL￿, by de￿nition. Given the two previous inequalities, it is clear that investment is also a decreasing
function of ￿.
3 The Open Economy
We extend the previous model to a world economy with two countries engaging in international trade, with free ￿ ow
of ￿nancial capital. Since we want to focus on the e⁄ects of the quality of credit market, we abstract from other
possible di⁄erences across countries. Hence, countries are assumed to di⁄er only with respect to the quality of their
credit markets, which will be responsible for trade pattern and growth rates, through the di⁄erences in innovation
rates and wages. Hereafter we denote the country with better credit market as ￿ North￿and the other one as ￿ South￿
. The superscript i; i = N;S; is used to denote the two countries, hence ￿N < ￿S.
We also assume that both countries have been in autarky for the same length of time before they start to
trade. From Proposition 1, we have then that the country with the best credit market will have a larger number of
intermediate goods when they open to trade.5 We study separately the equilibrium under alternative assumptions
with respect to knowledge spillover across countries, to trade in intermediate goods, and to technology transfers.
When there is knowledge does not transpose national borders, which is the assumption made in section 3.1,
the stock of knowledge available for each country is proportional to the number of intermediate goods that were
invented in that country, as in:
Ki(t) = ni(t); 8t: (27)
5We argue this is a reasonable assumption, since countries with better institutions tend to have relatively more developed industries
intensive in technology. Notice that our results still hold when both countries start trade with the same level of technological development.
12Alternatively, in sections 3.2 and 3.3 we assume that there is international knowledge spillover. In this case the
stock of knowledge in each country encompasses all varieties invented in both countries, that is:
Ki(t) = n(t) ￿ nN(t) + nS(t); 8t: (28)
In sections 3.1 and 3.2 we assume away technology transfers, that is, each intermediate good must be produced in
the country where it was invented, and we analyze the cases with and without international spillover of knowledge
and intermediate goods trade. Section 3.3 studies the case when an intermediate good can be invented in one
country and produced in the other through multinational ￿rms, under international knowledge spillover.
As in the closed economy case, we normalize ￿nal good prices so that EN + ES = 1 at all times.
With international trade of ￿nal goods, competition among suppliers of both countries implies that the equilib-
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when it is allowed,
(29b)
where the price of the high-tech good is derived using equations (7) and (5b).
The demand for the traditional good produced in country i is the country￿ s market-share, si
z, of global demand
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> > > > :
0; if wi > wk;
si
z 2 [0;1]; if wi = wk; and
1; if wi < wk.
(30)
Hence, production of the traditional good in country i, Zi, equals demand when:
Zi = si
zCZ, (31)
where CZ ￿ CN
Z + CS
Z:




















ni(t); when international trade of intermediate goods is not allowed;
n(t) ￿ nN(t) + nS(t); when there is trade of intermediate goods.
:
When trade in intermediate goods is not allowed, high-tech production costs may di⁄er across countries, and
the intermediate goods variety is produced only where its cost is lower. In this case, the demand for each variety of






y is the high-tech good market share of ￿rms from country i, and using equations (6) and (7). Given
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With trade in intermediate goods both countries will produce the high-tech good since they have equal access
to all intermediate goods, which equates production costs. The demand for intermediate goods from equation (6)



































In sum, the market for intermediate goods produced in country i is in equilibrium when its supply equals:
xi(j) = si ￿￿
niwi, j 2 [0;n], (36)
14where si equals either si
x or si
y, depending, respectively, on whether trade of intermediate goods is allowed or not.





3.1 Without International Knowledge Spillover
Given the knowledge pool available for each country when there are no knowledge spillover given by equation (27),
the FEC (19) becomes:
vini
wi ￿ ￿i, with equality when _ ni > 0: (38)
For the innovating country we have that vini = wi￿i, hence its NAC (22) becomes:
_ wi
wi = ￿i + ￿ ￿
sih
wi￿i. (39)





wi = L: (40)
In current setup, the equilibrium conditions yield the same characterization of the steady state as in the closed
economy case, that is:
_ wi
wi = 0; i = N;S:
3.1.1 Equilibrium Without Intermediate Goods Trade
The high-tech good is manufactured only in the country in which its price is lower, as can be seen by the de￿nition
of the market share of high-tech goods si
y in equation (34). The country that loses the high-tech good market will
also lose all its market for intermediate goods, when its trade is not allowed. All blueprints invented in that country
become useless, and no further innovation takes place.
Only North innovates
Proposition 2 Without trade in intermediate goods and without international knowledge spillover, there is no
equilibrium where both countries innovate under free trade of ￿nal goods. Only the country with the best credit
market innovates, and it captures all the market of high-tech goods.
Proof. Appendix 6.1 proofs that there is no equilibrium with both countries innovating. We argue below that the
only innovating country is North.
In the case of factor price equalization (FPE), North, which is the country that has the larger stock of blueprints
when international trade starts, takes the whole high-tech good market (see equation 34). Only in North inter-
15mediate goods have a positive value, since intermediate goods trade is not allowed. Therefore, only this country
innovates and the situation is self-perpetuating.
In the case of non-FPE, wages would have to be lower in South to render its production of high-tech goods
competitive, since, with a smaller stock of blueprints, South is relatively less productive in that sector. With lower
wages, South would capture all the market for the traditional good. South would have a higher demand for labor
both in the high-tech and in the traditional good production. The demand for labor for innovation would be same
in both countries, as they must innovate at the same rate in order for both to remain equally competitive in the
high-tech sector with constant wages. Hence, South would have a higher demand for labor than North, which is
not possible in equilibrium because, by assumption, their labor supplies are the same. With no FPE, only North
innovates in equilibrium.
The equilibrium is computed by the solution of the system composed by the NAC in equation (39) for North,
the FEC in equation (38) and the LMC in equation (40) for both countries, where the market share of traditional
goods si
z is de￿ned in equation (30), and given that North is the only innovator (￿S = 0) and it captures all the
market for high-tech good (sN
y = 1).
FPE equilibrium Under FPE, by de￿nition, we have that ￿ wN = ￿ wS ￿ ￿ w. Solving for the equilibrium value of
sN
z in the LMC of South (equation (40) for ￿S = 0) and substituting it back in the LMC of North, we get that:
w =
1 ￿ h
2L ￿ ￿N : (41)
In equilibrium, the NAC for North for _ w
w = 0, on its turn, becomes:
w =
h
(￿N + ￿)￿N : (42)
The world economy will be in equilibrium when equations (41) and (42) are satis￿ed at the same time, as well
as the LMC for South. They yield the following equilibrium values for the innovation rate in North, wages, and
North market share of the traditional good:
￿ ￿N =
2hL ￿ ￿(1 ￿ h)￿N
h + (1 ￿ h)￿N ; (43a)
￿ w =
h + (1 ￿ h)￿N
(2L + ￿)￿N ; (43b)
￿ sN
z =
(1 ￿ ￿)(L + ￿)￿N ￿ L
￿
h + ￿￿￿N￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(2L + ￿)￿N (43c)
remembering that h ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿).
Figure 3 compares the closed economy equilibrium to the one of the open economy with FPE. The NAC for
North is the same in both cases, while the LMC changes as pictured in Figure 3. The picture shows that, for North,
16wages are lower and innovation rate higher under free trade. We will see in the next section, though, that real
wages increase with trade.6 Moreover, the rate of innovation under free trade (equation (43a)) is more than two
times higher than that of North under autarky (24).
Figure 3: No knowledge spillover and no trade in intermediate goods: FPE equilibrium in North
We can also see from the picture that the condition for a non-negative innovation rate is easier to be met under







which is less strict than the condition for equilibrium in the closed economy, given by inequality (26).
Finally, it must be the case that ￿ sN
z 2 [0;1]. It is straightforward to check that ￿ sN
z is non-negative for all





h + [￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]￿N : (45)
The requirement that ￿ sN
z ￿ 1 also guarantees that ￿ ￿N ￿ L, so that the LMC for North will be satis￿ed.
Non-FPE equilibrium In the non-FPE equilibrium, the only possible con￿guration for wages in equilibrium is
^ wN > ^ wS. It implies that ^ sN
z = 0, and the LMC for North becomes:
wN =
￿￿
L ￿ ￿N : (46)
6This will also be true for the non-FPE equilibrium represented in Figure 4.
17Its NAC for _ w
w = 0 remains unchanged, and can be represented by equation (42). These two curves are represented
in Figure 4, and their interception yields the equilibrium wage in North and its innovation rate. Wages in South




h + ￿￿￿N (47a)
^ wN =
h + ￿￿￿N






z = 0 (47d)
Here, again, the condition for a non-negative innovation rate is weaker than in the closed economy in inequality













h + [￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]￿N : (49)
This last feasibility condition is exactly the opposite of the condition for an FPE equilibrium to exist, in inequality
(45).
Figure 4: No knowledge spillover and no trade in intermediate goods: Non-FPE equilibrium in North
183.1.2 Equilibrium With Intermediate Goods Trade
When trade of intermediate goods is allowed, countries may produce intermediate goods even if they do not produce
the high-tech good. In this case there is no waste of past invention when countries engage in international trade.
Only North innovates
Proposition 3 Without international knowledge spillover, there is no equilibrium where both countries innovate
under free trade of ￿nal and intermediate goods. Only North innovates, and both economies tend to the equilibrium
of the case without international trade of intermediate goods as time goes to in￿nity, which is de￿ned either by the
set of equations (43), in the case of FPE, or (47), in case of non-FPE.
Proof. Appendix 6.2 proves that only North innovates in all possible equilibria. Below we show that both economies
tend to the equilibrium without trade in intermediate goods.
FPE equilibrium We start with the equilibrium with FPE. The combination of the LMC for North and South,
using equation (40), yields equation (41), as in the case with no trade in intermediate goods. As for the NAC for
North for _ w
i




(￿N + ￿)￿N (50)




nN + nS : (51)
Since only North innovates, clearly sN
x ! 1 as time goes to in￿nity. Hence, the NAC in equation (50) approaches
equation (42) in the case of no trade in intermediate goods.
Figure 5 represents the FPE equilibrium. When the economies start to trade, wages and innovation rate in
North are given by the intersection of the curves LMCFPE and NACTradeInt. The latter converges to the curve
NAC as sN
x ! 1. Wages and innovation rate follow continuously the intersection of the LMCFPE and NACTradeInt
curves, approaching the equilibrium point E when time goes to in￿nity. The equilibrium values of the variables at
point E are given by equation (43). The feasibility conditions for this equilibrium are the same ones for the FPE
equilibrium without trade in intermediate goods, given by equations (44) and (45).
Non-FPE equilibrium In the non-FPE equilibrium, the dynamics of the NAC for _ w
w = 0 is the same as in the
FPE equilibrium just described, while the LMC changes. Wages in North are larger than in South and the latter




L ￿ ￿N : (52)
19Figure 5: No knowledge spillover but with trade in intermediate goods: FPE equilibrium in North
The dynamics is represented in Figure 6. The dotted lines NACTradeInt and LMCTradeInt represent equations (50)
and (52) for sN
x < 1, while the solid ones represent NAC and LMC when sN
x = 1. It is possible to show that
LMCTradeInt and NACTradeInt cross at exactly the same innovation level as in the long run equilibrium where
sN
x = 1.7 That is, in the path to the long run equilibrium the innovation rate is always constant and equal to ^ ￿
N
in equation (47a), while wages in North increase towards ^ wN in equation (47b) as sN
x approaches one.












x h ￿ (1 ￿ sN
x )￿￿ + [sN
x ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]￿N ; (53)
which becomes equal to the condition in the case with no trade in intermediate goods in inequality (49) when
sN
x = 1:
3.2 With International Knowledge Spillover
We now assume that domestic innovating ￿rms can access a worldwide pool of knowledge under free trade, as




n￿i; with equality when _ ni > 0, (54)








(L￿￿best) for the LMC in equation (52). It
is straightforward to show that these two partial derivatives are equal when ￿best = ^ ￿best from equation (47a). Hence, the NAC and
LMC curves have the same vertical change at that level of innovation rate.




n . Di⁄erentiating this equation in the case of equality, we get:
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n(￿i ￿ ￿j): (56)




















where si is either si
y; the share in the high-tech good production in equation (34), or si
x, the share in the intermediate
good production in equation (35), depending on whether trade in intermediate good is allowed or not.






wi = L: (59)
8The labor resources used in R&D activity by country i, L￿i, is calculated as follows. We have that the innovation rate is given by
dni





21As usual, equilibrium is characterized when the aggregate equity value is constant. Using the result in equation











= 0; i = N;S: (60)
Note that equation (60) does not ensure that wages are constant. According to the equation, they may decrease while
the blueprints share of the country increases, in such a way as to keep the value of the aggregate equity constant.
This cannot be considered an equilibrium as labor allocation would be changing across productive activities. Thus,








3.2.1 Equilibrium Without Intermediate Goods Trade
When there is no trade in intermediate goods, these goods have no value in the country that loses the high-tech
good market, so there is no further innovation in that country after trade opening. It is true that the inventions
in the country that does not produce the high-tech good would increase the world stock of knowledge, thereby
lowering the cost of new inventions also in the other country. This positive externality, however, has no market
value. Innovation can only take place in both countries if the high-tech good price is equal across them.
Both countries may innovate There is no FPE equilibrium with both countries innovating for the same reason
there is no such equilibrium in the case of no knowledge spillover, established in Proposition 2. There is, however,
the possibility of non-FPE equilibrium, which is characterized by the FEC in equation (54), the NAC in equation
(58) and the LMC in equation (59) for both countries, where the high-tech good market share si
y is de￿ned in
equation (34) and the market share of traditions goods si
z in equation (30). Nevertheless, this equilibrium is only
possible if North detains a speci￿c share of world blueprints at the time countries start to trade, as established
in equation (98) in the appendix. Thus, this is equilibrium is not likely to arise, and we let its exposition to the
appendix.
North always innovates The existence of knowledge spillover does not change the result that if only one country
innovates, it will be the one with the greater number of blueprints when international trade starts, which is the
country with better credit markets.
The equilibria allocation in this setup are equal to those that arise when there are no knowledge spillover,
presented in section 3.1.1.
3.2.2 Equilibrium With Intermediate Goods Trade
Both countries may innovate An analysis analogous to the case with no trade in intermediate goods applies
here. A non-FPE equilibrium with both countries innovating is possible, but only if, at the moment the economies
22open to trade, the share of blueprints in North equals exactly the solution of equation (104) in the appendix. At any
other blueprints distribution across countries when trade starts, North is the only one to innovate in equilibrium.
This is not an interesting equilibrium, since it will occur at a very speci￿c state of the economies. The description
of this equilibrium is in the appendix.
North always innovates
Proposition 4 When there are international knowledge spillover, North innovates in any equilibrium with innova-
tion, under free trade of ￿nal and intermediate goods. If North is the only one to innovate, both economies tend to
the equilibrium of the case without international knowledge spillover when there is no trade of intermediate goods.
Proof. In the appendix.
FPE equilibrium Under FPE we have that sN
x = sN
n . Using equation (58), the NAC with _ w
i





n ￿N + ￿)￿N ; (62)




n ￿N : (63)
Since only North innovates, sN
n ! 1, and equations (62) and (63) tend to equations (42) and (41), respectively.
The dynamics is represented in Figure 7. The curves NAC￿and LMC￿ FPE represent equations (62) and (63),
respectively, for sN
n < 1. They cross at the same level of wages at which curves NAC and LMCFPE do, which
represent equations (42) and (41), respectively.9 Hence, wages are constant and given by equation (43b) at all




2hL ￿ ￿(1 ￿ h)￿N
sN
n [h + (1 ￿ h)￿N]
; (64)
tending to ￿ ￿ from equation (43a) as sN
n ! 1.
Comparing equations (64) and (43a), we see that the rate of innovation is larger in this case, under knowledge
spillover and trade in intermediate goods, than in the case with no trade in intermediate goods. Nevertheless,
the amount of labor in R&D, L￿ = sN
n ~ ￿
N
FPE, is the same as in the two cases. This result is due to the fact that
the inventions from the non-innovating country are still produced in the current case, which increases the stock of









for both the NAC in equation (62) and the LMC in equation (63). Hence, the NAC and LMC curves
have the same horizontal displacement when departing from a crossing point of the two of them.











(2L + ￿)￿N ￿ L
￿
h + (1 ￿ h)￿N￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(2L + ￿)￿N
This is an equilibrium if 0 ￿ sN









h + (1 ￿ h)￿N ￿ 2(1 ￿ sN
n )￿￿
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n ￿ 1)￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]￿N : (65)
Note that the ￿rst inequality is always satis￿ed for a sN
n su¢ ciently close to one, while the second approaches the
corresponding condition (inequality (45)) of the case without knowledge spillover nor trade in intermediate goods
when sN
n ! 1. Finally, the condition for a positive innovation rate is the same as in the case without knowledge
spillover, given by inequality (44).
Figure 7: With knowledge spillover and with trade in intermediate goods: FPE equilibrium in North
Non-FPE equilibrium In the non-FPE equilibrium, the NAC for North for _ w
N
wN = 0 and the combination of the





n ￿N + ￿)sN





n ￿N : (67)
24Figure 8 represents the non-FPE equilibrium. NAC￿and LMC￿curves represent equations (66) and (67), while
NAC and LMC stand for equations (42) and (46), in which sN
x = sN
n = 1. In order to understand the relative
placement of the curves, let us investigate the e⁄ects of changes in sN
n and in sN
x in turn. NAC0 and LMC0
represent the curves for sN
x = 1 and sN
n < 1. It is straightforward to check that the displacement of the NAC curve
to the right is larger than that of LMC, so that they cross at a higher wage rate than the original NAC and LMC.
For NAC￿and LMC￿we have that sN








x for both curves, they will cross and the same innovation rate. Furthermore, given that sN
x > sN
n ,
the ￿nal placement of the NAC￿curve will be to the right of NAC and to the left of the point where LMC0 crosses








n (h + sN
n ￿￿￿N)
:
NAC￿and LMC￿approach NAC and LMC as sN
x and sN
n tend to one. In the path to the steady state equilibrium
wages North increases while the innovation rate decreases, tending to wages and innovation rates given by equations
(47b) and (47a), respectively.
Figure 8: With knowledge spillover and with trade in intermediate goods: Non-FPE equilibrium in North
In this equilibrium it is necessary that wN > wS. While it is not possible to write an explicit expression for this
















x h + sN
n [(2sN
x ￿ 1)￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]￿N ; (68)
which would be exactly the opposite of condition (65) for the FPE equilibrium if sN
n = sN
x : Although sN
x is itself a
function of w
N
wS , we know that sN
x ! 1 as sN
n ! 1: Hence, for sN
n su¢ ciently close to one, condition (68) approaches
10Note that NAC￿would cross LMC0 at w = ^ w if sbest
x = sbest
n :








which is equal to condition (48) when sN
n = 1.
3.3 Multinational Corporations
Here, we relax the assumption that invention and manufacturing of an intermediate good variety must be located
in the same country. Firms may now explore the comparative advantages across countries by producing the in-
termediate goods in a country di⁄erent from the one where it was invented. We denote these ￿rms multinational
corporations (MNC).
The variables pi, xi, ￿i denote no longer price, demand and pro￿ts of intermediate good varieties produced
in country i, but, rather, invented in that country. In previous sections one could use the both interpretations
interchangeably, since production and invention of a variety were located in the same place. Now the whole
production of intermediate goods is located wherever the wage is lower, no matter where these goods were invented.















The FEC is the same as in the case without multinational corporations, given by expression (54). With the






n￿k + ￿ ￿
h
wi￿i: (72)
As now the production of intermediate and traditional goods is located wherever the wage is lower, we have that
si = si
z, and si







Finally, the steady-state equilibrium characterization remains the same as in equations (60) and (61) in the
previous section.
26Both countries may innovate The equilibrium is characterized by the FEC (54), the NAC (72), and the LMC
(73) for both countries. From equation (56), it is clear that ￿N = ￿S in the steady state. The characterization
of this equilibrium is in the appendix. Like the other cases where both countries may innovate, the equilibrium is
only possible for speci￿c share of varieties in North when they start to trade. In this case, this share is given by
equation (105d) in the appendix. Thus, this equilibrium is no likely to arise.
North always innovates Here there is no equilibrium with only South innovating for the same reason that there
was no such equilibrium in the case without multinationals, in section 3.2. The NAC (72) is satis￿ed for North,
which is the innovator, while LMC (73) are satis￿ed for both countries. The FEC (54) is satis￿ed with equality for
North, and strict inequality for the South.
It is easy to check that with FPE the NAC and LMC turn out to be the same as in the previous case, with
knowledge spillover and trade in intermediate goods.














z = 0 (74d)





h ￿ (1 ￿ h)￿N :
Under this non-FPE equilibrium North specializes in R&D, while South produces all ￿nal and intermediate
goods.
3.4 Trade and Growth: Summary of results
We have seen that, in autarky, the economy with better credit markets grows faster, since its innovation rate is
larger. We have then analyzed the open economy under di⁄erent hypothesis with respect to trade of intermediate
goods, knowledge spillover across countries and technology transfer. In all cases studied North always innovates,
and its innovation rate is larger compared to the one in autarky. With respect to the South, in general it does not
invest in R&D any longer after opening. There is a possibility it also innovates when there is knowledge spillover
across countries, but this equilibrium is not likely to arise. Hence, opening to trade increases growth in the country
with better institutions and decreases it in the other country.
The high tech good is produced only in North, so that South imports high tech goods and exports traditional
27goods. When trade in intermediate goods is not allowed, South su⁄ers a capital loss. It looses its stock of blueprints
which become useless since the country no longer produces the high tech good. Moreover, growth in North is even
higher when there are international knowledge spillover and trade in intermediate goods. In this case South su⁄ers
no capital loss and continues to produce the previously invented blueprints, which increases productivity not in
both high tech good production and R&D activity in North.
Finally, we have considered the case where intermediate goods can be produced in a country di⁄erent from the
one where it was invented. A full specialization equilibrium may arise in this case, in which the North specializes
in R&D while the South produces all ￿nal and intermediate goods. With all its resources dedicated to R&D,
innovation in North achieves its highest value.
4 Welfare Analysis
We compare the welfare in autarky and in free trade for North and South, which di⁄er only with respect to the
quality of their credit markets. The possibility of knowledge accumulation as new blueprints are invented allows
for di⁄erent impacts of trade opening in the short and in the long run. Since individuals have the same preferences
in both countries, comparing welfare is equivalent to comparing their purchasing power. Therefore, we restrict our
analysis to investigating the purchasing power of the residents of each country in each of the cases studied.
4.1 Closed economy
The purchasing power of country i￿ s residents in autarky, Gi
aut, is given by their total net income, given by equation









Using the de￿nition of the price index in equation (1) and the equilibrium prices of ￿nal and intermediate goods









where z ￿ (￿￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿. It depends positively on wages and negatively on the number of varieties of the
intermediate goods.























where the steady state values of Li
￿ and wi
aut are in equations (24) and (25), respectively. The purchasing power is
a decreasing function of investment in R&D and of wages. Since, from proposition 1, these two variables are higher
in North, its residents￿welfare is lower than that of South residents when the stock of knowledge is the same across
countries. The reason for this result is that residents of North invest a higher share of their income in R&D projects,
so that, given the same stock of knowledge, they consume less than residents in South. Nevertheless, the number of
blueprints increases faster in North, leading to a faster decrease of its price index. If initially both countries have
zero blueprints, there will be a moment t￿ where the lower price index compensates the higher level of investment
in North. Thereafter, the residents of North are better o⁄, and the di⁄erence in welfare across countries increases
continuously.









1 ￿ ￿￿ + h￿S￿










￿ < 0, therefore the higher is the gap of quality in the credit markets, the shorter is the period
over which the welfare of the residents of North is smaller than the welfare of residents abroad.
4.2 Free Trade
We assume that there is free ￿ ow of ￿nancial capital when there is international trade, therefore all individuals can
invest in any innovation project, no matter whether he is resident of the country where the investment project takes
place or not.11 Since all individuals have the same logarithmic preferences, all of them devote the same share of
income to investment in R&D.
Let us denote ki(t) the share of the world capital (total number of blueprints) that belongs to residents of
country i, and let T be the moment the countries open to trade. We have that:
ki(t) =
ni (T) + w
i
wN+wS [n(t) ￿ n(T)]
n(t)
; for t ￿ T (80)
where n = nN + nS. Notice that in autarky ki (t) = si
n (t), where ki represents the gross national product in
the intermediate goods sector, while si
n represents the gross domestic product in that sector. When countries are
11Under the alternative assumption that each resident can only invest in its own country￿ s R&D we would get the obvious result that
Northern residents are richer in the long run because North grows faster.
29autarkies in goods and asset markets, ki and si
n must be equal.
When there is no trade in intermediate goods, all blueprints of South become useless, therefore kN (T) = 1 and
kS (T) = 0. With trade in intermediate goods we have that 0 < kS (T) < kN (T) < 1. In all cases, nevertheless,





wN + wS . (81)
It means that, under FPE, residents of both countries share equally the pro￿ts of intermediate goods ￿rms in the
long run, whereas when non-FPE equilibria arises North residents have a higher share of pro￿ts in the long-run.
The purchasing power of country i￿residents under free trade equals:
Gi
free(t) =
wiL ￿ wNL￿ + hki(t)
Pfree
, (82)













when both countries innovate. As we have seen, an equilibrium where both countries innovate is possible when
there are spillover of knowledge across countries, but it is not likely to arise.






























Without trade in intermediate goods In this case, sN














At the moment T when countries open to trade, the stock of blueprints owned by the residents of South is lost,
and we have that kN(T) = 1 and kS(T) = 0.
Non-FPE equilibria In non-FPE equilibria, we have that ^ wS < ^ wN < wS
aut < wN
aut, where ^ wS and ^ wN are
de￿ned in equations (47c) and (47b), respectively. The ￿rst inequality is the condition for the non-FPE equilibrium
30to exists, while the last one is derived from proposition 1. The middle inequality is shown through:
^ wN =
h + ￿￿￿N
(L + ￿)￿N <
h + ￿￿￿S
(L + ￿)￿S <
h + (1 ￿ h)￿S
(L + ￿)￿S = wS
aut:
Clearly, North residents are better o⁄ than those who live in South. The latter not only lose their accumulated
capital (stock of blueprints), but also face lower wages that those in North.
















Then last two terms are larger than one and they represent the country￿ s gain in purchasing power from opening to
trade. The ￿rst term (￿) indicates a loss arising from the fact that investment in R&D is higher under free trade
(see Figures 3 and 4), which decreases disposable income at the moment trade starts. For a share of high-tech good
in consumption (￿) su¢ ciently large, the country has a net gain when trade starts. More speci￿cally, it is possible
to show that ￿ ￿ 1






As for the residents in South, they have more to loose when trade starts. The ratio of their welfare under free


























First, they lose part of their wealth when their stock of blueprints loses its value. Second, investment in R&D
is higher under free trade compared to autarky, which decreases its disposable income for consumption in the short
run. These two e⁄ects are captured in the ￿rst term between brackets, which is lower than one. Finally, the e⁄ect
of opening to trade on purchasing power in terms of the high tech good is uncertain. On the one hand, those goods
are now produced by North, which has higher wages (second to last term in the equation). On the other hand,
that country has a larger number of varieties of the intermediate goods, which renders production more e¢ cient
and less costly (last term). The net e⁄ect depends on the di⁄erence in the number of varieties both countries had
just before starting to trade.
FPE equilibria Under the FPE equilibria the only di⁄erence in the purchasing power between the two
countries stems from their di⁄erence in wealth. North residents have an accumulated capital, which makes them
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Similarly to the non-FPE case, the residents of North are clearly better o⁄ when trade starts, as shown in
equation (89). The decrease in the price index more than compensates the decrease in disposable income due to
more investment in R&D after opening, so that their purchasing power increases.
Also like the non-FPE case, South residents may be better or worse o⁄, depending on the distance between
their stock of blueprints and that of North at moment T. The ￿rst term in equation (90) is smaller than one and it
captures both the lower disposable income due to higher investment in R&D and the losing of their previous stock
of blueprints. The other two terms depict the gain from a lower price index after opening to trade. Just as in the
non-FPE, the last term re￿ ects the higher e¢ ciency in high-tech production with the larger number of intermediate
goods varieties in the good country. It may be the case that North has so much more blueprints, that the reduction
in the price of the high-tech goods more than compensates the capital loss that occurs the moment trade starts.
Long run All the analysis so far refers to the comparisons of purchasing power and, therefore, welfare in the
short run. Let us now look at the long run impact of opening to trade. In the non-FPE equilibrium, we substitute











































Here, again, North residents are clearly better o⁄ than those of South, since ^ wN > ^ wS.
Comparing the purchasing power in the long run equilibrium in equations (91) and (92) to that in autarky in
equation (77), we see that, di⁄erently from the short run case, in the long run both countries￿residents are better
o⁄ under free trade compared to autarky. The terms between brackets are constant in all three equations, given
that the rate of innovation and wages are constant in the steady state. Hence, the di⁄erence between welfare under
free trade and under autarky in the long run is proportional to the di⁄erence in the number of blueprints. Since
the number of varieties increases faster under free trade than in closed economies, the distance in welfare tends to
in￿nity in the long run.
32With trade in intermediate goods We have seen in section 3.1 that, without international knowledge spillover,
only North innovates in all possible equilibria. Furthermore, in the long run, the equilibria tend to those of the
previous case, that is, without trade in intermediate goods. Therefore, the welfare analysis in the long run is equal
to the one above.
In the short run, South retains a share of the production of intermediate goods. The purchasing power of each
country is obtained by substituting equations (80), (84) and (85) into equation (83). With trade in intermediate
goods, South continues producing the varieties it had invented up to the moment of opening to trade. The total
number of varieties of intermediate goods used in the high-tech good production is larger than when there is no
trade in intermediate goods. This increases productivity, lowering the high-tech good price. Welfare is, then, higher
when there is trade in intermediate goods than when there is not such trade. The impact is even larger for the
residents of South, because now they do not incur in a capital loss when trade starts.
With international knowledge spillover Wages and investment in R&D are exactly the same as in the case
with no international knowledge spillover. Hence, the short run welfare impact of trade will be the same as in that
case. There is one important di⁄erence though. With knowledge spillover and trade in intermediate goods, the
stock of knowledge is larger compared to the case without knowledge spillover. Therefore, investment in R&D will
be more productive and the stock of blueprints will grow faster, yielding a faster increase of welfare.
With multinational corporations The welfare impact of trade when there are MNC is the same as in the case
with knowledge spillover and trade in intermediate goods, if the equilibrium arising under free trade is the one
with FPE. In the case of a non-FPE equilibrium, wages in North will be smaller and in South they will be higher
compared to the case with no MNC. Hence, there is less world wage inequality with MNC than without. Moreover,
the rate of innovation is the highest one in this case. The impact of welfare in the short run is uncertain, since
investment in R&D is higher for residents of both countries, compared to autarky. However, the faster increase in
the number of blueprint will provide a faster increase in purchasing power. Comparing all cases, this one may yield
the highest present value of welfare, if citizens￿valuation of the future is su¢ ciently high.
5 Concluding Remarks
New ideas may pop up at every moment and every place, but it is hard to know ex-ante their chances of success.
The risks involved in a project increase considerably when their assets are intangible, since in case of failure the
liquidation value is negligible. R&D projects are then a good example of investments that ask for diversi￿cation as a
form of risk sharing among economic agents, which is achievable through a well functioning ￿nancial system. Thus,
when countries engage in technological competition, R&D ￿nancing becomes the main instrument for creating
comparative advantage over time. A better functioning ￿nancial system generates more R&D research, which
33increases the innovation rate and renders the country￿ s high-tech sector more productive than abroad. This is the
basic idea of the model developed in this paper.
Recent empirical studies fail to ￿nd a positive relation between trade and growth. Furthermore, when controlling
for institutions the relation between trade and growth may even turn out to be negative is certain cases. We o⁄er a
possible explanation for these results. We suggest that the impact of trade on growth may depend on institutions.
More speci￿cally, we show that opening to trade increases growth in the country with better credit market, and
decreases growth in the country with worse credit market.
In terms of welfare, we show that the innovating North is better o⁄ than the South. In the short run South￿ s
welfare may be lower under free trade than in autarky. In the long run, however, all residents are better o⁄ under
free trade than if they were under autarky due to the higher rate innovation under free trade. Hence, whether it
is worth opening to trade depends on the present value of wealth under both situations. Calculations show that
opening to trade is more likely to be worth for all individuals when multinational corporations exist and economies
are not too small.
Wealth inequality across country is strictly increasing in the wage gap. Hence, there is no inequality when
FPE equilibria arise under free trade. Among all non-FPE equilibria, the largest inequality happens when there
are no knowledge spillovers between countries and when there are no multinational corporations, whereas the least
inequality arises when both of these features exist. All in all, these results point out that if South opens to trade,
it should try to promote knowledge spillover and multinational corporations.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2





￿ wN = ￿N. (93)




w , and equation (93) is not
satis￿ed. The FEC (38) can only be satis￿ed simultaneously for both countries if North is the only country that
innovates.
Let us now investigate the possibility of an equilibrium with both countries innovating when wN 6= wS. As there
is no trade in intermediate goods, both countries would have to produce the high-tech good, and its price would














36For the price of the high-tech goods to be equal across countries, it would be necessary that wN > wS, given
that nN ￿ nS when the countries start to trade and given equation (94). Furthermore, since _ wN = _ wS = 0 in
equilibrium, it must also be the case that n
N
nS remains constant so that equation (94) is always satis￿ed. Hence,
￿N = ￿S > 0. Using this result, we calculate the high-tech good market shares equalizing the no-arbitrage condition




wN￿N + wS￿S : (95)
We substitute it in the labor market clearing conditions of both countries (equation 40) and equalize them. We get:
￿N
￿ wN￿N + ￿ wS￿S ￿￿ =
￿S
￿ wN￿N + ￿ wS￿S ￿￿ +
(1 ￿ ￿)
wS :
The above expression holds only if ￿N > ￿S, which is a contradiction. Thus, there is no non-FPE equilibrium with
both countries innovating.
6.2 Proof of proposition 3
If both countries innovate simultaneously, equation (93) must be satis￿ed. With an argument analogous to the one





w , and equation (93) is not satis￿ed. The FEC (38) can only be satis￿ed simultaneously for both
countries if North is the one that innovates.
We turn to non-FPE equilibria. With trade in intermediate goods, we have that @v
i
@wi < 0; given the de￿nition
of vi in equation (10), the pro￿t function (37) and the de￿nition of the market share si in (35). Therefore, in the






wS when wN < wS, and there is no equilibrium with both
countries innovating as equation (93) is not satis￿ed.
There is also no equilibrium with wN > wS and positive innovation in both countries. In this case sN
z = 1, so
that the LMCs from equation (40) become:












From the de￿nition of market share sN































wN = _ w
S
wS = 0 in the steady-state, _ sN
x > 0 when ￿N > ￿S. As _ sN
x ! 1 we have that ￿S ! ￿￿ (using the
NAC in equation (39) for the South), which is not possible.
Finally North is the country that innovates in the non-FPE equilibrium for the following reason. The non-
innovating country must have the lower wage to capture the market for the traditional good. Otherwise, its
demand for labor would tend to zero as its share of the intermediate good market tends to zero. Let us assume
that South is the innovating one. We would have that wS > wN, hence ￿S < ￿N, yielding vS < vN: Since nS <





The FEC (38) for the innovating (South) country would imply:
vSnS
wS = ￿S;
which, combined with the previous inequality, would yield:
vNnN
wN > ￿S > ￿N; (97)
where the last inequality is an assumption of the model. According to inequality (97), the FEC would not be
satis￿ed for North. Hence, there is no equilibrium where South is the one that innovates.
6.3 Both countries may innovate when there is knowledge spillover
6.3.1 Without trade in intermediate goods
For both countries to innovate, it is necessary that both produce the high-tech good, hence pN
y = pS
y: According to
















1￿￿. It also implies that wN > wS, as nN > nS when countries start to trade.12
Furthermore, given that wages are constant in the steady state, the rate of growth of varieties in each country must
be equal, that is, ￿N = ￿S.







12One could wonder whether there could be an equilibrium path in which the worse country innovates faster when trade begins, so
that eventually nworst > nbest, and a steady state could be reached with such con￿guration. This cannot happen, though, because
there would be a moment when nworst = nbest. At that moment pworst
y = pbest
y would imply wworst = wbset, and the FEC could not
be satis￿ed simultaneously for both countries, as shown in the proof for proposition 2.
38where V ￿ ￿N ￿
wN￿ 1
1￿￿ + ￿S ￿
wS￿ 1
1￿￿ :





We now substitute equations (98), (99) and (100) into the LMC for each country in equation (59), using the
fact that sN
























wS = L: (101b)
Note that this result is di⁄erent from the case with no international knowledge spillovers, and the reason for it
is the following. Remember that in the case of no knowledge spillovers South could not innovate basically because
it was less productivity in the innovation activity, which would generate an excess demand for labor. In the case
of international knowledge spillovers, the productivity in R&D is the same across countries. Hence, when both
countries increase their varieties stock at an equal rate, and the one with a lower stock of blueprints will dedicate
relatively less labor to this activity, compared to the case without knowledge spillovers.
Nevertheless, this equilibrium is not likely to arise for the following reason. The equilibrium wages determined
in equations (101) are independent of the share of varieties in North sN
n . This equilibrium would only be possible
if sN
n at the time the economies open to trade were at a speci￿c level, established in equation (98), given wages
established in equations (101).
6.3.2 With trade in intermediate goods





















It is then clear that ￿N = ￿S in the steady-state with sN
x 2 (0;1). Substituting this result in the NAC for each

















￿ + (1 ￿ sN
n )(￿S)
￿: (103)
39With equations (102) and (103), and the LMCs for both countries, in equation (59), we obtain the equilibrium








n + LC = 0; (104)
where:


















+ ￿C + h + ￿￿￿N; and
C =
￿
h + (1 ￿ h)￿S￿
:
6.3.3 With multinationals
In this setup, there is no FPE equilibrium, as equation (72) cannot hold for both countries when _ w = 0 and
wN = wS. In the non-FPE equilibrium, equation (72) can be satis￿ed simultaneously for both countries only if:
wN￿N = wS￿S:
Therefore, wN > wS, and South will capture all the market of ￿nal and intermediate goods. Recall that when
intermediate goods have to be produced where invented, the country with lower wages captures only the traditional
good market. Since the amount of labor available for innovation is smaller compared to the case without MNCs
and the labor supply is the same in the two cases, the share of blueprints invented in South is smaller when there
are MNCs.
The equilibrium allocation is given by:
￿ ￿N = ￿ ￿S =
2hL ￿ ￿(1 ￿ h)￿S
h + (1 ￿ h)￿S (105a)
￿ wN =
h + (1 ￿ h)￿S
(2L + ￿)￿N (105b)
￿ wS =
h + (1 ￿ h)￿S




h + (1 ￿ h)￿S￿
L
2hL + ￿(1 ￿ h)￿S (105d)
40and it is feasible if sN













6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
South cannot be the only innovator First, we show that South cannot be the only one to innovate in
equilibrium. Let us assume it is in order to obtain a contradiction.
Substituting the de￿nition of si








1￿￿ + nS (wS)
￿ ￿
1￿￿
, i = N;S: (106)
From equation (106) we have that @v
i






given that the FEC is satis￿ed with equality for South. As ￿S > ￿N, we would have that v
Nn
wN > ￿N, and the
FEC would not be satis￿ed for North.
If wS < wN, then sN












respectively. As only South innovates, sN
x and sN








and, consequently, equations (107a) and (107b) could not hold simultaneously. Therefore, there is no equilibrium
with only South innovating.
Equilibria with only North innovating Now we investigate the equilibria where North innovates. We have
already seen that there is an equilibrium with both countries innovating. Here we study the equilibria with only
North innovating.
We start with the non-FPE equilibrium. Using an analogous argument to the one used above to show that there
is no equilibrium with wS < wN and with only South innovating, it is straightforward to show that there is also no
41equilibrium with wN < wS and where only North innovates.







where the inequality is due to the fact that @v
i
@wi < 0, and it is compatible with the FEC for South, as ￿S > ￿N by
assumption.
The NAC (equation (58)) for North becomes:
_ wN
wN = sN
n ￿N + ￿ ￿
sNh
sN
n wN￿N ; (108)












From equation (110), we have that:
wS =











































Let us now derive the system which represents the dynamics of the world economy. Combining equations (108),
(112), and (113), we get:
_ wN = (L + ￿)wN ￿
￿
wN￿￿ ￿
1￿￿ [1 + ￿(sN












42The di⁄erentiation of sN
n combined to equation (109) yields:
_ sN



















Equations (114), (115), (109) and (110) determine the equilibrium dynamics of the world economy. Solving that
system, equilibrium arises when sN
n = sN
x = 1. Equations (111), (112) and (113) tend to equilibrium values in
equations (47), which is the allocation of the non-FPE equilibrium with no international knowledge spillovers and
no trade of intermediate goods. The feasibility conditions for this equilibrium is the same as the ones in equations
(48) and (49).
We now consider the FPE equilibrium. Given the pro￿t equation (106), we have that pro￿ts are equal across
countries when wN = wS ￿ w, hence vN = vS. Combining this information with the FEC for North and the fact






= ￿N < ￿S:
The FEC is then also satis￿ed for South, with ￿S = 0. Under FPE si
x = si
n, for i = N, S, then the LMC (equation




















Adding up equations (116a) and (116b), we get:
sN




The wages is obtained by substituting the equation above in the NAC (58):
w =
h + (1 ￿ h)￿N
￿N ￿
2L + ￿ ￿ _ w
w
￿; (118)
which, substituted back into equation (117), yields the innovation rate:
sN
n ￿N =
2Lh ￿ (1 ￿ h)
￿




h + (1 ￿ h)￿N : (119)
43Finally, substituting equation (118) into (116b), we get North share of the traditional good market:
sN
z =
￿N (1 ￿ ￿)
￿





















The dynamics of the economy is characterized by equation (118), which can be written as:
_ w =
￿
(2L + ￿) ￿














which is obtained by substituting the equation (117) in the log-di⁄erentiation of sN
n .
Equations (121) and (122) above describe the dynamics of wages and blueprints. Wages and blueprint shares
are constant when sN
n = 1: Equations (118), (119) and (120) tend to equilibrium values in equations (43), which is
the allocation of the non-FPE equilibrium with no international knowledge spillovers and no trade of intermediate
goods. The feasibility condition for this equilibrium is the same as those in equations (44) and (45).
44